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.ts
r.*r rrc for air-crew in late 1955 . T-his report is a ccr ;a
Cf pr-v r r r review the results c-' trainin~g the first 52 aircrc*.. Sr-nci fically, :.-resr.Frof aircrew to the p-st-trainhr& critiq-,e ou'-st-fcr "Comrr:; c:. th G -E-w r t--briefing" is revieweld and analyzed. Th c, s ix c-a 1cr p c i n ts ofr in7r a-n c -c n the G-awareness briefing portion of the training program. includre:
(1, a clear, concise format, (2) "fighter aviation" r --in cy r-nl-(3) strornr cpr~r::.-*n orientation, (4) credibility of the instructor, (5) maxizrun utilization c' vi-aa r inc-idents/accidents, and (6) dedicated classroomn facilities/educational envir~et
Fighter aircrew have gfiven extremrely favorable ratinhgs to the current G-awarere~s briefing, the vast majority recommnending no changes whatsoever. Anr mdifica-: should therefore be reviewed very critically to ensure a continued hi'ghr level cf fi ghter-attack aircrew acceptability.
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INTRODUCTION
The Naval Air Development Center (NADC) initiated high G centrifuge training for r ava a iatcrs assigned to fighter-attack aircraft late in 1988 The human centrifuge, dynamic flight simulator ot NADO was utilized for the training. We previously described the general results of the aircrew training (1) In Part I of the review of aircrew critiques we described the program goals, the post-training questionna et (Appendix I) and a review of what aircrew considered the best part of the high-G training program (2) This report covers only what the aircrew responses were concerning the G-awareness briefing The responses in Appendix II were not all inclusive from the 525 aircrew who completed the critiques Only responses which contained information that could be of use to further our efforts to serve fighter aircreA through an enhanced G-awareness briefing are included in this report We were very gratified by the numerous favorable expletives provided by the aircrew (such as fantastic, super, outstanding. excellent good, and superb): however, we have not included these in Appendix II when they were given alone The data we reviewed is therefore only that which provided insight regarding the specific aspects of the G-awareness briefing that could be further strengthened Only 10 aircrew failed to complete critiques this was due to an early departure from the training prompted by awaiting navai air transportation A full appreciation of Liow the G-awareness briefing fits into the overall high.G training program. a;ong w ti its importance, rcq, ,v, review of ,.evious reports (1,2) We received 9Q overall negative critiques from any USN, USMC, or USAF aircrewman In fact, the vast majority of the aircrew critiques .ould suggest that minimal if any changes whatever should b-made to ,hc G-awareness briefing
THE G-AWARENESS BRIEFING
The G-awareness briefing was initially very similar to that previously developed tn train USAF aircrew (3). The G-awareness briefing is the given to aircrew as the first part of the high-G training program and lasts approximately I hour. Based on review of aircrew critiques following each class, modifications were continually made to enhance the briefing Every effort was also made to tailor each briefing and training session toward the specific mission of the aircrew in each class (F-14, F-18, A-7. F-16 or other aircraft). The main objectives of the G-awareness briefing are listed in Table I We frequently (and prefera,,:y) get aircrew from a specific squadron in for a training class. Since they all fly the same aircraft, it enhances the ability to focus on a specific weapon system. Getting a class composed of a single squadron has many advantages, not just in terms of tailoring the G-awareness brief'ng to them Although all aspects of the briefing are critical, we consider the very top priority of the G-awareness briefing to be the anti-G straining maneuver (AGSM). We specifically encourage aircrew to use the "HOOK" maneuver for the reasons we have described elsewhere (4). One of the major results of the aircrew feedback, both formal (as provided in the critiques) and informal, has been the exceptionilly favorable attitude of aircrew toward the "HOOK" maneuver (2). It should be stressed that the "HOOK' maneuver is not a new method of performing the AGSM. instead it is a new and extremely effective method of teaching the AGSM We prefer not giving a specific name to the AGSM (M-1 /L-1 terminology is an evident source of confusion for aircrew). The "HOOK" maneuver is just what you can do when you perform the respiratory component of the AGSM and therefore is an easily remembered nmenonic "Just say 'HOOK'!" also facilitates coaching during the very short centrifuge runs. This type of AGSM is not the only effective method to enhance tolerance to + G,-stress. A handout covering all the material in the G-awareness briefing, along with additional information relating to + G,-stress is given to all aircrew trainees upon arrival and prior to the G-awareness briefing In addition, a physical conditioning handout is provided to every trainee (5).
COMMENTS ON THE G-AWARENESS BRIEFING
The information included in Appendix II was taken from the specific critique question requesting "comments on the G-awareness briefing." The aircrew responses could be roughly grouped into 6 major NADC-91061-60 categories as shown in Table il . Ofice again, it should be stressed tha' the overwhelming majority of aircrew gave the G-awareness briefing very high marks exactly as it was delivered As previously described, some individuals considered the G-awareness briefing the best part of the high-G traning program (k;.
It is a unique privilege to be able to personally interact with the aircrew we, in fighter aviation medicine, continuously strive to serve and have them respond that your efforts are directly enhancing their combat capability and flight safety. Responses such as comment number 18 from a 29 year old F/A-18 pilot: "Super brief. I believe I walked away with a better anti-G straining maneuver*, commeit number 44 from a 38 year old A-7E pilot: "Excellent brief, I finally understand G-LOC'; comment numbtr 70 from a 44 year oid F-16 pilot: "Fant3stic -the first time it h3s been presented in a way I understood*. and comment number 7 from a 37 year old F-16 pilot: *Excellent -no bullshit or frills just fact -a rare thing these days" were all very gratifying They indicated that the established goals of the G-awareness briefing listed In Table I were met and even exceeded.
The importance of having a highly credible briefer with an extremely sound operational ba_-. "-iind cannot be overemphasized. The initial interaction w.th the aircrew trainees, and therelore their far, impression of the program, is the responzibility of this individual. The briefer sets the pace for the entire program. A sound understanding of acceleration physiology, fighter aviation medicine, tactical fighter operations, and centrifuge operations are some of the critical qualifications of the ideal briefer The importance of carefully selecting the briefer for the G-awareness briefing was reflected in the previous critiquc analysis concerning what the best part of the G-training program was (2) Comment number 23 from an F-14A pilot: "Vet/ interesting -good to be briefed by someone with so much backgroun in fighter aviation"; comment number 24 from a 30 year old F-16 pilot. "Very ciedible brief and discussion not in condescending medical-ese but on aircrew level', cons..,rnt number 46 from a 29 year old F/A-18 pilot: "Credibility of the DOC"; and comment number 49 from a 29 year old F/A-18 pilot "Excellent!! Did not insult the oilots' intelligence like some physiologists can do To the point' GOOD JOB" all attest to the care that must be exercised in selection of the G-awareness briefer It is our opinion that the optimum briefer should be a veteran fighter-attack aviator who has been thoroughly trained by an acceleration medicine subspecialist and has spent a period of time working with acceleration scientists at the centrifuge. The G-awareness briefers" job is not over upon completion of the formal didactics. They should remain with the aircrew trainees throughout the training, covering a, many fighter aviation medicine and physiology points as possible. reinforcing the previously covered ideas, gathering up-to-date operational information from fleet flying operations, obtaining informal aircrew input from the trainees, establishing a long-term fighter crew liaison that will ensure timely future feedback from flight operations (including possible G-related incidents/mishaps) and discussing recent research and development thrusts with the fighter crews. Gaining the full confidence of the aircrew pays long-term benefits for the program, fighter-attack operations, and naval aviation. The G-awareness briefer 's the critical focal point of all these activities. A significant number of aircrew specifically did not consider that the G-awareness briefing should be altered in any way whatsoever: comment number 16 from a 25 year old F/A-18 pilot: "Briefing was excellent. Just the right amount of depth and theory as well as app!icatfon'" and comment number 34 from a 28 year old NFO (non-flying officer): "Very informative -NO CHANGES," It was crystal clear that the length of the briefing was of major importance to the aircrew; comment number 27 from a 38 year old F-16 pilot: "Did not take 1 hour of info and make 8 hour briefing"; comment number 37 from a 25 year old F/A-18 pilInt "Real good -short and to the point"; comment number 46 from a 40 year old A-7E pilot: "Outstanding just the right length"; comment number 66 from a 27 year old F-14A RIO (radar intercept officer): "A good brief! Timed just right -not too long, not too short"; comment number 2 from a 24 year old F/A-18 pilot: "Perfect! No superfluous information as is usually the case"; and comment number 9 from a 29 year old F-15 pilot: "Excellent. Short to the point and what is needed to know." The G-awareness briefing, for a single-day training program, should remain just what it is titled.. a
NADC-91061-60
BRIEFing There is no question that a tremendous amount of inforrnalion a! ,,a is competes for a specif ic time niche in the briefing. For instance, physic_! cond:ioning for t,',e zircr :. coud tale up more thnr an hour (comment number 72). Every moment of precious aviator time should be filded with offly the most critical, ogerationall"i apolicable information
All additions or changes to the briefing should undergo critical and rigorous review.
Without question, the highlight and absolute "clincher' that brings home the absolute need for the entire G-training program, is the utilization of head-up-display (HUD) videotapes of G-related inciderlts and (unfortunately) mishaps. comment number 10 from a 26 year old F-14 pilot -The HUD tapes-were great -if more incidents and mishaps exist -show 'em -they are mvc-e et'c: The importance for every shred of the material being oriented to the ightle. aviator and the operational environment cannot be over-emphasized comment number 28 from a 43 year old A-7 pilot "Outstincling. Fighter pilot level". conment 63 from a 17 year old A.7E pile, 'Super. I understood everything. It was right on my level", and comment number 64 from a 43 year old F-4E pilot "Outstanding -a good carry over to aircraft."
The major points that we received ana took immediate action to correct were not numerous The one or two word responses on the critiques that were not listed separately in Append;x II contained no adverse or negative statements whatsoever. From over 500 aircrew, at most only four of the comments were not fully acted upon: comment number 68 from a 39 year old F-16 A-4 pilot 'I thought the briefing was too long, but they are probably about right for a new guy', comment number 60 from a 32 year old F-14 pilot: "Good -no discussion of effects of negative g", comment number 1 from a 34 year old F/A-18 pilot "Outstanding! I would suggest we get better statistics on Navy G-LOC vice Air Force We don't know enough about our own people": and comment number 22 from a 39 year old A-4 piot "Too much emphasis on death and debilitation, we all know and live with the consequences evpry day*" The vast majority, in fact all but a single individual (comment number 68). considered brief inc to be just the right length, therefore no change was made based on this comment Although it would be nice to provide much more information about a wide variety of inflight physiologic effects, perhaps including something on negative G (comment number 60). it is not important enough nor a goal of the training program and is not covered in the briefing. Comment number 22 which refers to G-LOC mishap HUD tapes does involve the actual loss of life; however, that unfortunately is reality and must be recognized as one, if not the major, driver for the G-training program. Exceeding operational -G,-tolerance can lead to G-LOC, injury, and death. We agree whole-heartedly with comment number 1 which suggests "We don't know enough about our own [naval aviation] people." During the Naval Research Council 1990 Summer Research Study, a major finding confirmed that the US. Navy documentation of fighter aviation incidents and mishaps was grossly lacking. This included G-LOC and + G,-related injuries Since the data and evidence does not exist, we have not been able to present it as part of the G-awareness briefing. We have fortunately been able to secure and use some HUD videotape G-LOC episodes from Navy and Marine fighter-attack aircraft and now utilize them in the program Securing videotapes from fleet aircraft and operational incidents and accidents is the responsibility of the whole of naval aviation. Collection of this vital information should be centralized and provided to the G-training
program. Although the facilities at NADC do nct provide an optimal layout for a pr iate classoori to deliver the G-awareness briefing, we very carefully ensure the sequestration of the adrcrew during the entire G-training program. Even a rare ln ,tance of interru,-on of the G-aw.areness bIefing is intolefable and is instantly noted by the aircrew (comments number 42 and 57)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The G-awareness briefing is an integral part of the aircrew high.G training program It is evident that the G-awareness briefing utilized rt NADC gets exceptionally high ratings from fightet.atlack aircreA We are keen to keep it updated and eager to include as much naval aviation specific information in n as . available. This is partly the responsibility of the whti~e of naval avalon to provide such timel, information. Much more emphasis should be placed through appropriate authority to gain such operationally applicable information. It is evident such emphasis which could further enhance aiatof safety is currently lacking The major points concerning aircrew critique of the G-awareness briefing included keeping the briefing concise, strongly operationally oriented, delivered in a specific classrocm facility by a highly credible individual and making maximum use of videotape instructional media Although the vast majority of aircrew did not recommend any change be made to the G-awareness briefing, we believe continual effort should be expended to maintain a unique vitality for the program The opportunity and forum provided by high-G training program to interact with fighter attack avitors is a tremendous opportunity for the fighter aviation medicine and physiology communities to enhance their support to fighter operations. Extreme care should be exercised f major changes are made to Ithe content of the briefing or overall program in light of the strong positive response of aircre,,, to the current program. It is evident that the NADC aircrew high-G training program is an exremely successful program that directly supports fleet operations There is every indication that the program direcl y enhances flight safety, combat capability, and mission effectiveness 
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